Book review: Interanimations: Receiving Modern German Philosophy by Alderwick, Charlotte
Robert Pippin’s Interanimations is in a sense an extended argument for the value of 
the history of philosophy as a method of doing philosophy.  The book begins with an 
impassioned defence of this kind of philosophical method, and Pippin hopes that the 
text as a whole will serve as an argument for this claim, as well as a demonstration 
that the philosophers he deals with here are relevant to contemporary concerns.   
 
Philosophy, for Pippin, is essentially dialogic – its nature involves discussion, a back-
and-forth between positions – all philosophers are engaging with some other 
philosopher or position.  Choosing to engage with a historical figure is therefore 
justified as it amounts to choosing the best starting point from which to begin one’s 
own dialogue. 
 
Pippin argues that the history of philosophy (as a method of philosophizing rather 
than an exercise in textual reconstruction or historical situating) is fundamentally 
about re-animating ideas, using these ideas and engaging with them in debates that 
are live and relevant today.  Therefore we shouldn’t be too worried about whether 
we read our own concerns or views into historical figures (as long as we can be 
honest about when and the extent to which we do so), as this is what the process of 
engaging with historical figures, of re-animation, is all about.  This claim should be 
borne in mind when approaching the text – it is clear that a lot of Pippin himself ends 
up in the figures that he deals with. 
 
The rest of the text constitutes a series of Pippin’s engagements with contemporary 
thinkers’ interpretations of Hegel and Nietzsche (with the exception of one chapter 
on contemporary Kantians, and one chapter on Pippin’s interpretation of Nietzsche).  
Although this method is at times helpful in bringing out subtle differences between 
Pippin’s views and those of his interlocutor, it can sometimes make the text rather 
hard going – if looking at Heidegger’s Nietzsche seems difficult enough, a further 
level of difficulty is added by looking Pippin’s Heidegger’s Nietzsche in dialogue with 
Pippin’s own Nietzsche.  While this does occasionally add to the difficulty of the text, 
it is justified by Pippin’s overarching argument – these are reanimations, dialogic 
encounters which also serve as an exploration of Pippin’s own views. 
 
The first chapter deals with a number of contemporary Kantians, focusing on 
responses to the rigorism and formalism objections.  The argument is essentially that 
these modern responses either fail to fully meet the objection, or concede too much 
ground to be properly Kantian positions.  The concluding argument of the chapter 
provides a nice transition to the chapters on Hegel – many contemporary responses 
to the formalism objection attempt to ground the claims of Kantian ethics on some 
independent absolute value (such as the end-setting capacity of reason).  As Pippin 
argues, this response is simply unavailable to Kant given the setup of the Critical 
system; it is, however, a response which is available on a Hegelian picture.  Whether 
it is a response that is available to Pippin’s Hegel is unclear, a point I return to below. 
 
The Kant chapter is followed by chapters dealing with Brandom, McDowell, Zizek, 
and Honneth’s Hegels.  Some of the most difficult sections of the text are the 
chapters on McDowell and Brandom – one has the feeling that these debates are so 
familiar to Pippin that he forgets that may not be as familiar to others, and at times 
not enough is done to make clear the significance of particular points of 
disagreement, or the ways in which Pippin’s Hegel is able to escape the problems he 
raises for McDowell and Brandom’s, especially given the closeness of their views.   
 
There is a general worry which arises repeatedly in the chapters on Hegel, and which 
Pippin alludes to in a footnote in the final pages of the text: Given an account of 
Hegel (such as Pippin’s) which makes minimal metaphysical commitments and 
denies any role for the absolute in grounding value or structuring the development 
of reason, how is it possible to defend the claim that we make some kind of progress 
in our rational endeavours?  How can we know that our apparent progress in our 
systems of sense-making is not simply a matter of historical contingency?   Pippin 
raises this point in the chapter on Brandom where he argues that the latter is unable 
to account for the ways in which a system of sense-making can suffer a breakdown, 
but it is not made clear how Pippin’s Hegel would fare better. 
 
The above relates to the worry I mentioned earlier: on this minimally metaphysical 
account of Hegel, it is not clear how Pippin’s Hegel is able to claim that there is some 
independent value which attaches to reason; and in his rejections of other views 
Pippin does not do enough to make his own (presumably preferable) view clear.  For 
example, the question of the ground of reason arises a number of times throughout 
the Hegel sections: Zizek’s claim that reason is grounded in an abyss (or, put 
differently, in the irrational) is rejected; McDowell’s claim that reason is grounded in 
nature is rejected; and Brandom’s account is criticized for relying too heavily on 
subjective practices to ground reason.  However, Pippin’s own account is never 
made explicit, and given the above rejections it is hard to see that there is much 
philosophical space left for an alternative view. 
 
The second half of the text deals with Nietzsche, engaging with Nahmas, Williams, 
Heidegger, Strauss, and MacIntyre’s particular re-animations.  There is also a chapter 
outlining Pippin’s own expressivist take on Nietzche, and this and the final chapter 
on MacIntyre are the two in this section which seem to contain the most of Pippin’s 
positive view. 
 
Although a lot of ground is covered in the text, there are a number of central themes 
which tie the work together, and which give insight into Pippin’s own concerns: the 
nature of normativity and the possibility of normative change and progress play a 
central role.  There is also a question of grounding and origins which runs 
throughout: how can we make sense of freedom, reason, or the self as self-
constituting?  If the self becomes what it is through self-constitutive acts, how are 
we to think about what is acting prior to and within these acts of self-constitution?  If 
freedom only exists within certain collaborative rational and social practices, how 
are the free acts necessary to enter into these practices possible?  These questions 
serve to structure and bring together the various philosophers Pippin tackles; the 
one disappointment of the text is it is never made explicit exactly how or whether 
Pippin’s own account is able to deal with them. 
